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Abstract
The paper identifies a number of misconceptions about the monetary policy process and the monetary
transmission mechanism in the UK.  Among the misconceptions about the process are the alleged lack
of regional and sectoral representativeness of the Monetary Policy Committee and the view that
operational central bank independence means that monetary and fiscal policy are not properly
coordinated.
Among the transmission mechanism misconceptions, the “New Paradigm” figures prominently.
Among the New Paradigm changes in the British economy that have been given prominence are the
following: increasing openness; lower global inflation; lower profit margins, reflecting stronger
competitive pressures; buoyant stock markets; a lower natural rate of unemployment; and a higher
trend rate of growth of productivity.  I argue that the New Paradigm has been over-hyped and
misunderstood as regards its implications for monetary policy.
Other misconceptions include the ‘death of inflation’, the ‘end of boom and bust’, a couple of
Neanderthal Keynesian fallacies and the monetary fine tuning fallacy.
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Monetary Misconceptions
Willem H. Buiter
Non-Technical Summary
The paper reviews, and attempts to correct, some of the most common misconceptions about the
monetary policy process and the monetary transmission mechanism in the United Kingdom.
Among the misconceptions about the monetary policy process in the UK following
operational central bank independence since June 1997, is the view that the Monetary Policy
Committee of the Bank of England ought to be a body representative of regional, sectoral,
industrial or other sectional interests, rather than a collective of technical experts.  A related
criticism is a variant of the ‘one-size-fits-all’ critique of a common, nationwide monetary policy
when different regions or sectors exhibit divergent behaviour, either because they are hit by
asymmetric shock or because they respond differently to common shocks.  The critics are,
however, unable to explain how a single nationwide instrument can be used to fine-tune the
cyclical performance of divergent sub-national regions and sectors.
The criticism that operational independence of the central bank invites a lack of
coordination between monetary and fiscal policy confuses centralisation and coordination.  In the
UK, there can be no conflict of objectives between the monetary and fiscal authorities, because
the chancellor sets the objectives for both.  There also are effective mechanisms for exchanging
information between the MPC and the Treasury.  Strategic uncertainty (uncertainty about how one
player will respond to the actions of the other player) is not an issue because of mutual recognition
that both parties are locked into a repeated game without an obvious terminal date.  Even without
the formal, visible trappings of binding agreements, this encourages cooperative behaviour.
As regards misconceptions about the monetary transmission mechanism, the so-called
‘New Paradigm’ deserves special mention.  Stripped of the razzamatazz surrounding it, the ‘New
Paradigm’ is the assertion that globalisation and information technology are transforming the
global economy and the way we work, shop and live.  Directly or indirectly, this could have any
or all of the following six implications for the real economy of the UK.
(1) The UK economy could become more open.  This could manifest itself in trade in real
goods and services, trade in financial claims and international movements of real factors of
production, including labour, physical capital, corporate headquarters and other organisations.
Knowhow and technology also become more footloose.  Finally, persons can move more freely
across national boundaries in any or all of their capacities:  as workers, consumers and shoppers,
as portfolio holders and as tax payers or subsidy/benefit seekers.  Tax avoidance and evasion and
benefit seeking through international mobility can of course be undertaken (or used as a threat) by
any entity with legal personality, not just by natural persons.  This threatens national tax bases and
puts upward pressure on national public spending programmes.  It also creates incentives for
intergovernmental cooperation and harmonisation of tax and benefit regimes.  
(2) Global inflation could be lower.  This may apply just to commodity price inflation or
to the prices of all internationally traded goods and services.  
(3) There could be a permanent reduction in profit margins or mark-ups in many sectors.
(4) Stock market valuations could be boosted to unprecedented levels.
(5) The NAIRU (the equilibrium or natural rate of unemployment) could be lower than
before.  
(6) The underlying rate of growth of productivity could be higher than before.  This would
2raise the sustainable growth rate of potential and actual real output. 
The fourth of these, booming stock markets warranted by fundamentals, that is, by higher
future profits or lower equity risk premia, is argued to be the opposite of what is likely to be
implied by globalisation and IT.  What is good news for productivity and consumers is unlikely
to be good news for shareholders.
The implications of the other five manifestations of the New Paradigm for monetary policy
in the UK are argued to be less than straightforward.  I assume that the objective of monetary
policy, on consumer price inflation target, remains the same.  All the New Paradigm stories are
about real, structural changes in the economy.  To infer their implications for inflation or for the
monetary policy consistent with a given inflation target requires an analytical framework that
allows the joint determination of real and nominal magnitudes.
Increased openness has no implications for the average level of the UK short nominal
interest rate that supports an unchanged inflation target, in either the short run or the long run.
With a floating UK exchange rate, lower global price inflation does not have any
implications for the average level of the short nominal interest rate that supports an unchanged UK
inflation target, in either the short run or the long run. 
Even a permanent reduction in profit  margins, or a permanent reduction in the NAIRU,
have at most a temporary downward effect on the level of short nominal interest rates consistent
with an unchanged inflation target.  
A permanent increase in the growth rate of total factor productivity has no obvious
implications for the level of nominal interest rates that supports an unchanged inflation target, in
the short run or in the long run.  In the long-run, the effect on the short nominal interest rate depends
on what happens to real interest rates.  In the short run, it depends on how the gap between demand
and potential output is affected by the structural changes that boost the underlying growth rate of
productivity.  
Other popular misconceptions include the belief that inflation is dead, that we have seen
the end of the business cycle (‘the end of boom and bust’), and the belief that monetary policy can
be used to fine tune the national business cycle.
1 I am stopping the clock on revisions to this first sentence as of November 8, 1999.
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1. Introduction
The Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England has just completed its 30th monthly
interest rate setting round and its 10th quarterly inflation forecast round.1  Having been part of the
MPC process since its inception in June 1997, I feel well-placed for a bout of reflection.  On
another occasion I intend to reflect on what I have learned during these past 27 months - about
processes, institutions and the monetary transmission mechanism.  Today I want to review, and
debunk the most common misperceptions I have encountered, out there in the ‘real world’, about
the monetary policy process and about the monetary transmission mechanism.  These
misconceptions matter for the conduct and performance of monetary policy, because they help
shape the psychological environment, anticipations and confidence, within which we operate.
Since June 1997, our nine-member Committee has been charged by the Chancellor of the
Exchequer to pursue an inflation target (a 2.5% annual inflation rate for the Retail Price Index
exclusive of Mortgage Interest Payments (RPIX)), and subject to that, to support the government’s
other objectives, two of which are mentioned specifically:  growth and employment.  Since June
1998, these objectives and the modus operandi of the MPC have had a statutory basis in the Bank
of England Act 1998.
On the basis of our experience thus far, I conclude that the legal and institutional framework
within which we operate was rather well-designed, and that the conduct of monetary policy within
that framework has been reasonably competent.
A key feature of our arrangement is that it combines an operationally independent Monetary
Policy Committee with the political determination of the objectives of monetary policy.  That is
the way it should be.  Central banks or monetary authorities, run by appointed technocrats, do not
have the political legitimacy to determine the targets of monetary policy.  In a democratic society,
only the elected government can be entrusted with that responsibility.
Another key feature of our inflation target is that it is symmetric.  It does not say:  2.5% or
less.  It says:  2.5%, neither more nor less.  The symmetry of the inflation target sets a ceiling on
where inflation can go, but it also, indirectly, sets a floor under the level of real economic activity.
The symmetry of the target is underlined by the so-called open letter procedure.  Should
inflation outcomes depart from the target by more than 1%, in either direction, the Governor, on
behalf of the MPC, is to write an open letter to the Chancellor.  In this letter he has to explain why
the overshoot or undershoot happened; what we are going to do about it; over what horizon we
expect to be back at the target; and how all this is consistent with our mandate.  An important
feature of this open letter procedure is that it recognises that there are circumstances, temporary
supply shocks are an example, under which pursuit à l’outrance of the inflation target would be
excessively costly in terms of real economic performance.  There has not yet been any need to
invoke the procedure.
The target is 2.5% on the RPIX index, not zero.  Most real-world price indices are likely
to overstate the rate of increase of the true, but unobservable, cost of living index.  One reason is
what economists call ‘substitution bias’.  Inflation rates are never uniform for all goods and
services.  When they are not uniform, relative prices change, and consumers will typically
substitute towards goods and services whose relative prices have fallen.  In addition, there are
likely to be quality improvements, including new and superior goods and services, that are not
captured by the index.  
Against these unrecorded quality improvements should, however, be set some unrecorded
2 Recent attempts by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the US to reduce various biases in the way it
measures its consumer price index (CPI) has lowered recorded CPI inflation by about 0.7% a year.
3 See Orphanides and Wieland (1998), Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (1999) and McCallum (1999).
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quality deterioration.  Quality deterioration does occur, and ‘technical regress’ is not limited to
the fall of the Roman Empire.  In the UK, for instance, the quality of public transport services has
been in secular decline.  In the US, the quality of public education is likely to have been on a
downward path for quite a while.  To the extent that local taxes, which finance most of public
education at the primary and secondary levels, enter the consumer price index, the rate of inflation
will be underestimated.  
Even making generous allowance for a possible net upward bias, a 2.5% RPIX target is
unlikely to represent much less than 1.5% inflation in the true cost of living2.  So why not shoot for
true price stability, 0% inflation on the true cost of living index and, say, 1.0% inflation on the
RPIX?
I believe that an important reason for not targeting a significantly lower rate of inflation
than our current target, is a key asymmetry in the monetary transmission mechanism.  Until we
implement procedures for paying negative interest on currency (taxing money), there is a floor at
zero under our main policy instrument, the short nominal rate of interest.3  The inflation target
should be set at a level that makes it unlikely that, for the kind of exogenous shocks and endogenous
cycles likely to be encountered, short nominal interest rates would hit that zero floor and be
constrained by it.  
Our openness and accountability are unsurpassed among modern central banks and
monetary authorities.  We are answerable to the Chancellor of the Exchequer through the open
letter procedure.  We are answerable to the appropriate House of Commons and House of Lord
Committees, who can call any or all of us whenever they want to.  The Bank of England’s Court
vets our procedures, including the key issue as to whether we make appropriate use of regional,
sectoral and industrial information, and the internal resource allocation in the Bank of England.
We publish the individual votes cast at our monthly meetings within two weeks of the
meeting, together with a set of non-attributed minutes that summarises the key issues, concerns and
point of views that shaped the collective decision and the nine individual votes.  We publish a
detailed quarterly inflation forecast.  
Individual MPC members travel widely and regularly around the country, talking and
listening.  This supplements the information we get from the Bank’s network of regional agents,
from the Non-Executive members of Court, and from the very wide range of data, statistics and
surveys that we absorb every month.
2. Misconceptions About the Monetary Policy Framework
2.1. The composition of the MPC
The composition of the MPC is a feature of our arrangements that I consider to be a source of great
strength.  It has, however, given rise to considerable and continuing criticism.
The MPC is a collective of technical experts, not a body representative of regional,
sectoral and industrial interests.  It should be no other way.  Once the objectives of monetary
policy are set, monetary policy becomes a technical issue.  The fact that monetary theory is a
4 The UK arrangements are unusual (probably unique) in permitting non-UK nationals to co-
determine UK monetary policy.  
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contested field, and that our capacities as forecasters are limited, simply means that monetary
policy is a very difficult technical matter.  But, if you have a tooth ache, you want the best possible
dentist, not a regionally, sectorally or industrially representative dentist.  The composition of the
MPC should be representative of the best monetary policy expertise that is available, in the UK
and worldwide.4 
Monetary policy expertise can be acquired in many different ways.  It does not require an
advanced degree in economics or other obvious manifestations of pointy headedness.  It is
certainly possible, that people who have spent their entire working lives as entrepreneurs, or in
executive or managerial positions in businesses or in trades unions, may have acquired knowledge,
skills and expertise that would make them effective members of a monetary policy making
committee.  It is, however, not likely to be a common occurrence, since those directly engaged in
creating wealth have many other demands on their time.  Monetary policy, whether working through
the exchange rate, through interest rates or through the credit channels, is but one among a multitude
of factors impacting on enterprise performance and on the terms and conditions of employment of
unionised and non-unionised workers.
Entrepreneurs, executives, managers and trades union officials will form views on the
impact of monetary policy on their enterprise, sector, or labour market.  We seek out these views
assiduously, through direct personal contact during our regional visits, through the regular briefings
by our regional agents and through the information provided by the non-executive members of the
Court of the Bank of England.  These personal views at times reinforce and at other times qualify
or contradict the information we receive from the many surveys and conventional statistical
sources of information that we receive on a regular basis.  In either case, they are an important
input into our deliberations.  
Few among these entrepreneurs, executives, managers and union leaders will have the time
or the inclination to venture an informed guess about the impact of monetary policy on the economy
as a whole.  Even fewer will be able to look at things from the opposite perspective:  not ‘how
does monetary policy affect me, my firm, my industry, my sector, my region or my union’, but ‘how
does monetary policy have to be set to achieve the government’s objectives for the economy as a
whole’?  I firmly believe the current arrangement is best. 
2.2. ‘One size fits all’:  is monetary policy insufficiently sensitive to divergent regional,
sectoral and industrial developments?
The common criticism that UK monetary policy is insufficiently sensitive to divergent regional or
sectoral developments is misplaced.  It is true that we must pursue our single, UK-wide inflation
target, and our mandate to support, subject to this inflation target, UK-wide growth and
employment, with a single, UK-wide instrument, our short-term interest rate.  In an integrated
financial system, there cannot be one interest rate for the South East, a separate one for Northern
Ireland and a third for Scotland, or one rate for the service sector, one for manufacturing and one
for the oil industry. 
We pursue our mandate without regional, sectoral or industrial fear or favour.  We
carefully build up our view of what is appropriate for the UK as a whole from a very wide range
of sources of information.  Much of this information is regionally, sectorally and industrially
disaggregated.  And it has to be, because when the whole is not homogeneous, we can only
5 Even simple non-linearities are sufficient to make the behaviour of the aggregate different from that
of a scalar blow-up of any of the disaggregated units.
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understand the whole as the explicit sum of all of its parts.  An economy that grows at 2.5% per
annum on average and in each of its regions, sectors and industries, may be a very different animal,
as regards it short-term and medium-term inflation performance, from an economy where half the
regions, sectors or industries grows at 5.0% and the other at 0%.5  Likewise, an economy where
the unemployment rate is a uniform 6.0%, is a very different animal from an economy with the same
average unemployment rate but widely divergent regional, sectoral and industrial unemployment
rates.  
But, in the end, regional, sector and industrial developments matter for our policy decision
if and to the extent that they inform our pursuit of the nationwide targets.  We are acutely aware that
monetary policy, which in an economy like the UK works to a large extent through the exchange
rate, impacts very unevenly on the internationally exposed sectors and the internationally sheltered
sectors.  This means that when monetary policy is tightened, the internationally exposed sectors
suffer more than the internationally sheltered sectors, just as the internationally exposed sectors
benefit more when monetary policy is eased.  
I firmly believe that, by resolutely pursuing macroeconomic stability for the UK economy
as a whole, we contribute, over the long haul, to a business climate that is superior, in every region
and for every industry and sector, to what could be achieved through any other policy.  Economy-
wide macroeconomic stability is an essential precondition for economy-wide growth and
prosperity.
2.3. Central Bank independence and monetary-fiscal policy coordination
Lack of monetary-fiscal policy coordination is a common criticism of the current arrangements.
Under the ancien régime, both monetary policy and fiscal policy were the sole province of the
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury.  The critics of the new operationally independent
Bank of England argue that while the new arrangements may have bestowed greater credibility on
the monetary authority, they have reduced the ability to coordinate fiscal and monetary policy and
created scope for conflict.  
This criticism is mistaken.  It confuses centralisation with coordination.  In the late and
unlamented Soviet Union, all economic management was centralised.  It was also very badly
coordinated.  In the UK today, there cannot be a conflict between the targets of monetary and fiscal
policy.  The key point is that the MPC only has operational independence.  It does not set the
objectives of monetary policy.  There can be no conflict between the targets of monetary and fiscal
policy, because the Chancellor sets them both.  
Even if there is no conflict of objectives, lack of coordination could result from the MPC
and the Treasury not knowing what the other party is doing and thinking.  This potential lack of
information has two dimensions:  uncertainty about how the other party views the exogenous
environment within both parties operate, and strategic uncertainty about how one party will
respond to the actions of the other party.
There is, in fact, a very effective flow of information between the MPC and the Treasury.
A Treasury Representative attends the meetings of the MPC in a non-voting capacity.  The Treasury
Representative speaks and listens.  He does not attempt to exercise pressure or twist arms.  We
receive regular briefings and other updates on budgetary issues and prospects that are relevant to
the monetary policy decision.  The Governor meets regularly with the Chancellor.  The notion that
either party is unaware of what the other party knows and thinks, is wrong.
6 Of course, the game with their opponents is (meant to be) non-cooperative; no binding agreements
can (should?) be made.
7 See e.g Julius (1999).
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It is true that, even if there is no conflict of objectives, and even if there is no uncertainty
about what the other party knows or believes about the common policy environment, there may be
‘strategic uncertainty’ about how one party would respond to an action of the other party.  The
analogy here is with a rugby team.  All players on the team have the same objective:  to annihilate
the opposition.  They all share the same information about playing conditions and the opposition.6
The players on each team must, however, play cooperatively in order to be effective.  They must
make binding commitments to make certain joint contingent moves, if they are to achieve the shared
team objective.  
There is no formal mechanism that allows the MPC and the Treasury to act ‘cooperatively’
in the way game theorists use that concept, that is, to make binding commitments about current and
future policy actions or decision rules.  The policy game, however, is a repeated game.  Our
monthly interest rate round has, thus far, been repeated 30 times.  For practical purposes, we can
view the interaction of the Treasury and the MPC as an ‘infinitely repeated game’.  As time passes,
repetition and reputation make it possible to achieve outcomes very close to what can be achieve
in a formal cooperative arrangement.  Lack of coordination of monetary and fiscal policy simply
is not an issue.  
3. Misconceptions About the Transmission Mechanism
3.1. The New Paradigm:  over-hyped and misunderstood as regards its implications for
monetary policy
Whenever words like ‘New Paradigm’ are in the air, extreme caution is required.  There are a few
thoughtful, well-informed and eloquent proponents of the view that recent and likely future ‘supply
side’ developments have shifted the path of future potential output, and may have invalidated the
old empirical relationships between real economic performance and inflation.  I am fortunate in
having a colleague on the MPC, DeAnne Julius, who is one of these few, and who  has greatly
added to my understanding of how the evolving international environment impacts on our inflation
target.7  Another independent member of the MPC, Sushil Wadhwani, has contributed important
insights on structural changes in the labour market, and related changes in the product markets, and
their implications for monetary policy. 
Unfortunately, the ‘New Paradigm’ label has been much abused by professional hype
merchants, financial quacks and peddlers of economic snake oil.  Every age appears to have a deep
psychological need to be unique, revolutionary and paradigm-shattering.  I am sure that, after
Prometheus gave fire to mankind, financial analysts in ancient Greece had some pretty lurid new
paradigm write-ups in their brochures.  The same must have happened following the invention of
animal husbandry, agricultural crop growing, the wheel, the spinning wheel, the steam engine, the
railways, the internal combustion engine, the chemical and electrical revolutions and the paper
clip.  Sometimes the hype was justified.  Often it was not.  
Stripped of the razzamatazz surrounding it, the ‘New Paradigm’ can be summarised as
follows.  First, increasing and unprecedented globalisation, driven partly by technological change
8 See e.g. Giordano (1999).  The term ‘experience goods’ is due to De Long and Froomkin (1998). 
The formalisation of the concept goes back, at least, to Arrow (1962).
9 Much of what is classified as general government GDP, should probably not be counted as GDP at
all.  GDP is supposed to represent final output, value added in consumption and investment.  Public
administration, including law and order and defence, represents, functionally, intermediate public goods and
services.  Their contribution to national value added is measured in the value of those goods and services
(private and public) that are actually consumed or added to the capital stock.  Current practice is a classic case
of double counting.  
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and partly by the deliberate removal of government-created barriers to the international movement
of goods, services, people, financial capital, enterprises and ideas, has transformed the
international and domestic competitive environments.  Second, information technology, the
marriage of cheap and near universally available digital computing power and telecommunications,
is transforming the global economy and the way we work, shop and live.  The Internet is the most
visible expression of this:  e-commerce, e-shopping and e-business are becoming as common as
e-coli.  New products, new processes, new forms of organisation, new ways of trading and
exchanging information, in brief, new ways of doing old things and new ways of doing previously
unheard of and unthought of things, are made possible by the new information networks that are
sprouting everywhere, courtesy of ‘Moore’s Law’ and broadband technology.  
There are huge microeconomic and regulatory challenges here, and economists have to
rethink the meaning of competition, which is Schumpeterian rather than Arrow-Debreu. 
‘Information goods’, with their public good properties of non-rivalness (associated with
indivisibility, high (and sunk) fixed costs or start-up costs and low marginal costs) and non-
excludability or inappropriability, are destructive of the conventional competitive paradigm.  The
fact that, when we trade or exchange information, we don’t really know what we are getting until
we have had a chance to use the information (information goods are ‘experience goods’) further
undermines the conventional view of how markets and competition work.8  More visibly than ever
before, competition, in the presence of indivisibility, inappropriability and uncertainty about what
one is buying or selling, is seen to be a process of creative destruction, of rivalry between
alternating or succeeding monopolies, not the peaceful price-taking behaviour of the old textbooks.
The rewards for being first with a new product or process are larger than ever before, as are the
penalties for being pipped at the post - a winner-take-all economy.
The new economy creates huge challenges for measurement and for the interpretation of
data.  Even with traditional, tangible goods, allowing for new products and for quality change
creates daunting conceptual and practical problems for statisticians.  Measuring output in the
traditional service sectors has always been problematic, even when the services were marketed.
For the 20 to 30% of GDP produced by the public sector, most of it non-marketed, the national
income accountants have traditionally admitted defeat and measured output by input9.  In recent
years, attempts are being made in the UK to measure productivity changes in the public sector, an
important but extremely complicated exercise.  The new weightless and intangible sectors make
it ever more difficult to measure both inputs and outputs.  Extracting reasonable estimates for
productivity growth when neither inputs nor outputs are measured reliably is a statistical
nightmare.  While, in principle, valuing Microsoft is no different from valuing a steel company -
the fundamental valuation for both is the (risk-adjusted) present discounted value of future profits -
predicting future profits and determining the appropriate risk premium are both exercises in
subjectivity and inaccuracy. 
Globalisation and information technology are not independent.  New developments in
10 The first known printed book, using block printing, came from China (AD 868).   Block printing
appeared in Europe during the late 1300's.  Movable type using clay was invented in China during the 1000's. 
Koreans invented movable type in the 1300's.  Europeans reinvented this particular wheel in the mid 1400's.
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information technology are among the technological forces driving globalisation.
Globalisation and the spread of information technology pose two key questions for
monetary policy makers.  First, how unique are these processes, and what is the magnitude of the
‘supply-side transformation’ that is underway as a result of these changes?  Second, given one’s
best guess about the quantitative significance of these supply side changes, what do they imply for
the conduction of monetary policy?
Globalisation is not something new.  The current wave of globalisation started in the
immediate post World War II period.  A highly globalised economy existed also in the second half
of the 19th century, until World War I and the interwar crises caused the fragmentation of the global
capitalist system (see Bordo, Eichengreen and Kim (1998) and Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin
(1999)).  There are important differences between the globalised economy of the gold standard
days as the current phase.  Information flows much more freely, swiftly and universally today.  The
range of financial instruments that is traded across national borders is much wider than it was in
the 19th century.  Against that, labour mobility under the gold standard was much less restricted by
the nation state than it is today.
Technological revolutions also did not start with the ‘information age’.  The industrial
revolution gave us, more than 200 years ago, the systematic application of science and engineering
to production, distribution and exchange.  The beginning of the 19th century witnessed the coal and
iron (later steel) age, with the widespread use of the steam engine and of mechanised weaving.
Towards the middle of the 19th century came the railway age, followed by the telegraph,
photography and cement.  Mass production, based on mechanised assembly lines, transformed the
production of tangible goods.  Around the turn of the 20th century arrived electrification, the
chemical industry, the automobile and aluminium.  The 1950s brought synthetic fibres, nuclear
energy, electronics and the space age.  More recently, microelectronics, optical fibres, laser
technology and biotechnology give ever greater weight to the ‘weightless’ economy.  
The information revolution pre-dates the industrial revolution.  It started with the invention
of the printing press and accelerated with the arrival of the telegraph, photography,  the telephone,
radio and television.10  Recognisable computers are almost 50 years old.  The microchip and the
Internet are the latest exciting chapter in a very old story indeed. 
It all sounds impressive, and some of it certainly is.  But a sense of proportion is essential.
The failure of many of the evangelists of the new information age to distinguish between data and
information is a serious obstacle to sensible discussion.  It is possible (and in my experience quite
common) to have data coming out of one’s ears, yet to have very little useful information.  Those
who confuse data with information may be the victims of the lingering influence of the old
‘cybernetic’ definitions of information, which treated numbers of bits and bytes, the units in which
data are stored digitally, as a reasonable proxy for the content and quality of information.
The key question raised by the “New Paradigm” for the Monetary Policy Committee is:
what are its implications for the way we set about pursuing our mandate?
The New Paradigm (Globalisation and IT) could, directly or indirectly, have any or all of
the following six implications for the real economy of the UK.  
(1) The UK economy could become more open.  This could manifest itself in trade in real
goods and services, trade in financial claims and international movements of real factors of
production, including labour, physical capital, corporate headquarters and other organisations.
Knowhow and technology also become more footloose.  Finally, persons can move more freely
11 It may be the case that, because of domestic political distortions, the level of public spending and
taxation would be suboptimally high in a closed economic system.  In that case, openness and the threat of tax
and benefit competition may result in a level of public expenditure and taxation that is lower than the closed
economy level and closer to the optimal level.
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across national boundaries in any or all of their capacities:  as workers, consumers and shoppers,
as portfolio holders and as tax payers or subsidy/benefit seekers.  Tax avoidance and evasion and
benefit seeking through international mobility can of course be undertaken (or used as a threat) by
any entity with legal personality, not just by natural persons.  This threatens national tax bases and
puts upward pressure on national public spending programmes.  It also creates incentives for
intergovernmental cooperation and harmonisation of tax and benefit regimes.  
(2) Global inflation could be lower.  This may apply just to commodity price inflation or
to the prices of all internationally traded goods and services.  
(3) There could be a permanent reduction in profit margins or mark-ups in many sectors.
(4) Stock market valuations could be boosted to unprecedented levels.
(5) The NAIRU (the equilibrium or natural rate of unemployment) could be lower than
before.  
(6) The underlying rate of growth of productivity could be higher than before.  This would
raise the sustainable growth rate of potential and actual real output.  
As regards increased international openness, it seems likely that there is more to come. 
For trade in goods and services, we are unlikely to see growth of the kind seen in the sixties and
seventies, but a more gradual increase in import and export shares in GDP is on the cards.  Exports
and imports as shares of UK GDP, are still about 5 percentage points below their pre-World War
I peak.  International trade in financial claims is spectacular for a rather limited range of financial
instruments.  In the years to come, we are likely to see both an extension of this range of
international financial instruments and a gradual erosion of the ‘home bias’ in the portfolio
allocations of UK financial institutions, including pension funds and insurance companies.  Labour
mobility is likely to increase, but will remain small in relation to the UK labour force.  Enterprises
will become more footloose, with corporate headquarters, back office operations and R&D
establishments following in the wake of manufacturing assembly plants and call centres.  FDI
flows, bundling finance, technical expertise and managerial skills are likely to become more
significant.  The traffic will be two-way.
The greater scope for tax payers and benefit seekers to move to jurisdictions with lower
tax rates or more relaxed enforcement, and to jurisdictions with higher benefits and easier
eligibility, will put increasing strains on the public finances everywhere.  Unless more effective
ways are found to link liability for tax payments in a given jurisdiction to eligibility for benefits
from public spending in that same jurisdiction, the threat of mobility of tax payers and benefit
recipients will severely constrain the fiscal authorities.  This can have a significant influence on
effective marginal tax rates and effective benefit and subsidy eligibility, even if little actual
movement is observed, and lead to suboptimally low levels of public spending and taxation.11
Turning taxes into user charges for public expenditure benefits is both technically and politically
difficult.  Mrs Thatcher’s attempt to sell the Community Charge (the so-called poll tax) to the
British people as a payment for local public services was a political disaster.  
National governments will be torn between tax and benefit competition and attempts at
greater cooperation and harmonisation.  It is difficult to predict the ultimate outcome of this
process.
As regards the scope for lower global inflation, it is important to distinguish between short-
term cyclical patterns and long-run trends.  The long-run trend in global inflation will be
12 Rational speculative bubbles, that is, bubbles that do not violate the no-arbitrage assumption of
technically efficient financial markets would have to satisfy . EtBt%1 ' (1 % rt)(1 % D
q
t )Bt
Irrational speculative bubbles could do just about anything.
13 Hall (1999) argues that this fundamental valuation should include not just the physical capital stock,
but also ‘intangible capital’ or organisational capital.  His empirical investigation does not, however, consider
the possibility of persistent and significant monopoly rents.
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determined by the weighted sum of the various national inflation objectives, adjusted for the degree
of seriousness with which they are pursued.  There is no evidence that the rest of the world is
likely, on balance, to pursue inflation objectives and to achieve inflation outcomes, that are
significantly different from those pursued and achieved in the UK.  
We cannot be confident that the relative prices of commodities, hard or soft, to other
internationally traded goods and services will have any clear trend.  Even if they did, there are no
obvious implications of a change in the relative prices of commodities for the global inflation that
is relevant to the UK’s domestic inflation objective.  
In the short run, global inflation can be viewed as being driven in part by the global output
gap, just as domestic inflation is driven, in part, by the domestic output gap.  Commodity price
inflation is more responsive than inflation in more broadly based indices of internationally traded
goods and services to supply constraints in the producer nations and to changes in global economic
activity.  As long as a global output gap persists, we can expect to see continued downward
pressure on world inflation.  Global output is likely to be below global capacity for a while yet.
Even in the US, capacity utilisation ratios are not reported to be unusually high, although
unemployment has fallen to a very low level.  The euro area is recovering, but overall should still
have some margin of spare capacity.  Japan continues to be very depressed.  South East Asia is
recovering rapidly, but from a very low level.  
It should be clear that (3), reduced margins, and (4), unusually strong stock market
valuations, are unlikely to be both correct, at any rate if we limit the discussion to stock market
valuations warranted by fundamentals, that is, by risk-adjusted discounted future profit streams.
Speculative bubbles can, for a while, support any and all stock market valuations.  Equation (1)
is a fairly standard representation of stock market valuation, involving only minor hand waving.
The real value of the stock market index is denoted q, the stream of future profits , the risk-free2
real interest rate r, and the equity risk premium .  Et is the expectation operator conditional onDq
information available at time  t.  B is the speculative bubble component in stock market valuation.12
The first term on the RHS of (1) is the fundamental valuation of the stock market.13 
If  is the mark-up of price on unit labour cost, and Y is real GDP, then (ignoring profitµ
taxes)
14 For a less bearish view, see Keating and Wilmot (1999).
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I believe that recent developments in IT are, by and large, making markets more
competitive and more contestable.  Entry and exit in many industries is easier than before.  This
is good news for consumers, for productivity and efficiency and quite possibly for human
happiness, but it is bad news for profits.  In terms of equations (1) and (2), the New Paradigm will
boost the future path of real GDP, which is, other things being equal, good for profits, but it will
lower margins, that is, lower , which is, other things being equal, bad for profits.µ
Profits consist of two components:  the competitive rental rate on capital and monopoly
rents.  You do not get a stock market boom out of competitive capital rental rates.  Booming stock
markets are produced by current and anticipated future rents.  Rents rely on the absence, at least
temporarily, of effective competition.  If the New Paradigm is correct, rents in many sectors will
be competed away more swiftly and effectively than ever before.  Bad news for profits should
mean bad news for the discounted stream of future profits, that is, bad news for stock market
valuations.  There are exceptions.  If a private company manages to establish a monopoly around
a product with strong network externalities which effectively becomes an industry standard, entry
becomes very difficult and very large rents can be extracted.  There are, however, very few
Microsofts.  The stock market glory of a very few will be balanced by the stock market debacles
of many.14
What do the supply side developments captured under items (1), (2), (3), (5) and (6)  imply
for monetary policy in the UK?  I assume in what follows that our symmetric inflation target is
unchanged.  I measure the stance of monetary policy through the behaviour over time of our main
policy instrument, the short risk-free nominal rate of interest.  Throughout it is important to
distinguish between short-term changes in the path of short nominal interest rates consistent with
the inflation target, and long-term changes.  We must also distinguish between ‘time series’
comparisons - will rates be different in the future from what they were in the past - and
‘counterfactual’ comparisons -  will rates be different from what they would have been in some
alternative, counterfactual, state of the world.
Let us, for the sake of argument, grant the proposition that the UK economy will become
increasingly open, that the world rate of inflation will be lower than in the recent past, that the
equilibrium rate of unemployment is lower than before, that the underlying rate of growth of
productivity is higher than before and that a sustained reduction in reduction in profit margins or
mark-ups is underway.  Even if we accept this qualitatively, the actual magnitudes are, of course,
extremely uncertain.
All five developments, increasing openness, lower world inflation, the lower equilibrium
unemployment rate, the higher rate of growth of potential output and the lower profit margins are
real phenomena.  There is many a slip between the cup of real, structural change and the lip of
inflation.  One of the key insights that macroeconomists and monetary economists can bring to the
New Paradigm debate is the recognition that relative price changes, distributional changes and
other structural changes have no straightforward, obvious implications for inflation or for the path
of interest rates that supports a given inflation target.
15 For recent surveys on global financial integration, see Oxford Review of Economic Policy (1999). 
16 The exact expression is 
1 % i t
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'
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3.1.1   Increasing openness and UK monetary policy
Increasing openness of the UK will not have clear implications for the average level of interest
rates that support the inflation target, in the short run or in the long run.  Increasing openness to
trade in goods and services implies that monetary policy, to the extent that it works through the
exchange rate, will have a more powerful effect on the price level and a weaker effect on the real
economy.  The reason is that, through a variety of behavioural mechanisms, greater trade openness
increases the responsiveness of domestic nominal costs and prices to the exchange rate.  Increasing
financial openness will tend to make the exchange rate more volatile, and this may be reflected in
greater interest rate volatility.  There is no clear link to the average level of rates, however.
3.1.2. Lower global inflation and UK monetary policy
The rate of inflation of world prices, including commodity prices, translated into imported
inflation through the nominal exchange rate, is an important component of retail price inflation in
the UK.  In the long run, differences between the UK’s rate of inflation and the inflation rate in the
rest of the world, will be reflected in nominal exchange rate depreciation or appreciation, unless
sustained shifts in the structure of the world economy mandate a change in the relative price and
cost configurations between the UK and its trading partners.  
It is difficult to establish a clear presumption that the ratio of relative prices charged and
paid by UK PLC should, on trend, rise or fall steadily.  On the maintained assumption that the UK
pursues an unchanged inflation target with a market-determined exchange rate, the global inflation
rate, whatever it turns out to be, should therefore not have any implications for the level of UK
nominal interest rates in the long run.  This argument assumes that the long-run  world real interest
rate does not vary when the world inflation rate varies.  I elaborate on this below.
In the short run, a lower global rate of inflation that does not signal a permanent reduction
in the level of world prices relative to UK prices, has implications for UK nominal interest rates
that are far from straightforward. 
To get a benchmark, I assume that an internationally financially integrated economy like
the UK, the domestic short nominal rate of interest is related to the foreign short nominal interest
rate
through exchange rate expectations and a currency risk premium.15  Let i be the short UK nominal
interest rate,  the world short nominal rate, S the nominal spot exchange rate (defined as the pricei f
 of foreign exchange in terms of sterling),  the proportional rate of depreciationFt%1 '
St%1
St
& 1
 of the nominal spot exchange rate and  the foreign exchange risk premium.  Then,Ds
approximately16, 
17 The exact expression is .  UIP is a spectacular empirical failure.  It not only
1 % i t
1 % i ft
'
EtSt%1
St
predicts badly; it appears to be subject to systematic bias also.  For a survey of its empirical shortcomings see
Wadhwani (1999) and Cochrane (1999).  There is some evidence it may work better (in the sense of not
producing systematically biased forecasts) at very long horizons (low frequencies), as argued by Meredith and
Chinn (1999).  There are many potential reasons why UIP is outperformed, for predictive purposes and at all
except the very longest horizons, by such simple rules as a constant exchange rate (the ‘random walk’
hypothesis).  One is a particular form of small sample bias called the ‘peso effect’.  Current expectations of
the future spot rate may be influenced by a very dramatic but very low probability future contingency.  This
event (say a major collapse) may not (yet) have  occurred in the sample period.  Time-varying or random risk
premia are another way to rationalise failures of UIP.  Since predicting future risk premia is even more of an
uphill task than predicting the spot exchange rate, this is not a practically useful insight for making UIP,
augmented with time-varying risk premia, a better forecasting rule.  
18 The distinction between RPI and RPIX does not matter for the argument under consideration.
19 The exact expression is .Et[(1 % r t)(1 % B˜t%1)] / 1 % it
20 Strictly speaking, .1 % B˜t ' (1 % Bt)
1&"[(1 % Bft)(1 % Ft)]
"
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For present purposes, foreign exchange rate risk premia are not a concern, and will be
ignored.  Without the foreign exchange risk premium, (3) implies uncovered interest parity (UIP),
that is, (approximately)17
The UK is small in the global financial markets, so I take  to be exogenous.  The (exi f
ante) domestic short real interest rate is related to the short nominal interest rate through the
expected rate of inflation.  I take the rate of inflation to be the rate of inflation of the retail price
index, our inflation target.18  Let  be the retail price index and  the rate of inflation of the RPI,P˜ B˜
that is, .  It follows that, approximately,19B˜t%1 /
P˜t%1
P˜t
& 1
The retail price index is a weighted average of the price index of domestic value added,
P, and the index of world prices, , translated into domestic currency.  Let the share of importsP f
in the RPI index be .  The world rate of inflation is denoted .  It follows that (approximately)20" Bf
15
B˜t ' (1 & ")Bt % "(B
f
t % Ft) (6)
r ft / i
f
t & EtB
f
t%1 (7)
The (ex-ante) world short real interest rate, , is defined (approximately) as follows:r f
Since the UK is too small to influence the world rate of inflation, the world rate of interest
too, is taken to be exogenous.  Note, however, that only two out of the world real rate of interest,
the world nominal rate of interest and the (expected) world rate of inflation can be fixed
independently.  The third is implied by the other two.
If the fall in the world expected rate of inflation is not matched by a fall in the world real
interest rate, it must be matched by a fall in the world nominal interest rate.  In that case, the lower
world inflation would be translated into matching increase in the rate of depreciation of sterling,
with no impact on short nominal rates in the UK or on the UK rate of RPI inflation, short run or
long run.  In the somewhat messier real world, there may of course be lags in the transmission of
world price changes and exchange rate changes into sterling import prices, as well as expectation
errors and changes in risk premia which upset this neat picture, but it is the obvious benchmark.
If the decline in expected world inflation is not associated with a commensurate fall in
world nominal interest rates, there must have been an increase in the world real rate of interest.
To determine what happens to UK nominal exchange rate depreciation, and thus to UK nominal
interest rates, cannot be determined from equations (4) through (7) alone.  We need a complete
model (including a model of UK demand, supply, wage and price determination), in order to be
able to jointly determine the responses of UK nominal rates, real rates, inflation and exchange rate
depreciation.  Indeed, the same factors that caused an increase in the world real interest rate and
a fall in the world rate of inflation, are likely to affect the UK economy through other channels, not
yet considered, such as the global demand for UK exports.  
The main message is that the short-run impact on the path of UK nominal interest rates
consistent with an unchanged UK inflation target, of a decline in world inflation, is not necessarily
in accord with the common, instinctive presumption that UK rates can be lower  without this
endangering the inflation objective.  In the benchmark case where the world real interest rate is
unchanged, a lower world rate of inflation neither implies that UK short nominal rates can be
lower than before, nor that they can be lower than they would have been without the change in the
global inflation rate, if an unchanged domestic inflation objective is to be achieved. 
3.1.3. Lower profit margins and UK monetary policy
A reduction in profit margins, or in the mark-up on unit variable costs, can result either from
intensification of product market competitive pressures (a reduction in the degree of monopoly
power of a firm in the markets for its products) or from a weakening of a firm’s competitive
position in the market for its inputs, labour, raw materials and other.  Such a change in firms’
competitive position corresponds, at the level of the economy as a whole, to a distributional
change, away from profits and towards labour income.  
Consider the following simple example of an economy in which the markup of the GDP
deflator on unit labour costs is independent of the price of imported intermediate and raw
materials inputs.  
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One can view the bundle of goods and services entering the RPI, denoted Q, as being
produced using labour, capital and imported inputs.  Let W be the money wage, L employment, PN
the domestic currency price of imported inputs, N the quantity of imported inputs,  the nominalDK
rental rate of capital and K the capital stock.  Output is produced using a well-behaved, constant
returns to scale production function, , where A is the level of total factorQ ' AF(K, L, M)
productivity.  A monopolistically competitive firm maximises pure profits,
.  Assume input markets are competitive.  The first-order conditionsP˜Q & DKK & WL & PNN
for profit maximisation are 
where  is the price elasticity of demand.  Nominal accounting profits, ,,(Q) / & P˜(Q)
˜QP )(Q)
1 / P2
where P is the GDP deflator, are the sum of pure profits and the rental income of capital,
 .1/P˜A FKK%
1
,
(FLL%FNN)
 Value added for the domestic economy is the sum of accounting profits and wage income.
This permits us to write the value added deflator as a mark-up on unit labour cost, as
follows:
The proportional mark-up on unit labour cost, denoted µ, is given by
21 Note that , the price elasticity of demand, is unlikely to be a constant.  Different models can,
produce either pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical behaviour of the mark-up.  
22 Our simple mark-up model could be extended to allow for monopsony power in the labour market,
and in input markets generally, or could be extended to include bargaining over wages, as in Layard, Nickell
and Jackman (1991).
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With a profit-maximising monopolist, .  The mark-up is therefore positive and, > 1
decreases with the elasticity of demand.  In general, the markup will also depend on the input
ratios.  When the production function is Cobb-Douglas, , theQ ' AK "L $N 1&"&$; 0<",$,"%$<1
mark-up simplifies to (12), which is independent of input intensities.21
A decline in the mark-up, µ, is a reduction in the ratio of price to unit labour cost.  There
is nothing in this mark-up change per se, that tells us anything about the behaviour of nominal
prices and wages.  All we know is that the nominal price level path falls relative to the path of
money wages.  The reduction in margins could be achieved, for a given path of money wages,
through lower prices.  While theoretically the lower price level could be achieved through a
single, discrete drop in the price level, in practice there is likely to be a gradual approach to the
new equilibrium price level path, that is, a temporary reduction in the rate of inflation.  It could
also be achieved, for a given path of money prices, through a higher path of money wages.  In this
case there would be not even a temporary effect on the rate of price inflation.  Instead there would
be a temporary increase in the rate of inflation of money wages.  Indeed, the reduction in the mark-
up could be associated with a temporary increase in the rate of price inflation, if it were
accompanied by an even larger temporary increase in the rate of money wage inflation.  
In order to determine the impact of lower margins on price inflation, we must know what
happens to money wage inflation.  Our instincts (which tend to be short-run Keynesian), may tell
us that money wage inflation is unlikely to be affected by the fall in margins, when this fall in
margins is the result of more intense competition in the product markets (a higher value of , using,
the model of equations (11) or (12)).  This gives the standard story that  permanently lower
margins lead to a lower path of the price level.  Again, in the real world, this will show up as a
temporary dip in the rate of inflation.  Our instincts may be wrong.  These same instincts would
create a presumption that lower margins would be achieved through a temporary increase in money
wage inflation with unchanged price inflation, if the lower margins are the result of increasing
labour market power by the unions, or by labour in general, organised or unorganised.22 
I accept the proposition that, in the case of a fall in the mark-up due to increased product
market competition, money wage inflation is indeed likely to be given in the short run,
23 For some reason, probably a combination of ignorance and inadequate  acknowledgement, this
model has become known as the Fuhrer-Moore model (Fuhrer and Moore (1995)).  
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predetermined by existing contracts, settlements and payments practices.  This means that, in the
short run, short nominal interest rates can be lower than they were before, and lower than they
would have been in the absence of the fall in margins, without this endangering the inflation target.
In the medium and longer run, money wage inflation ceases to be anchored in the past.  It
is always influenced significantly by expected future price inflation.  We cannot explain inflation
with inflation.  We need a further nominal anchor from outside the realm of the real economic
relationships.  That nominal anchor is provided by our pursuit of an unchanged inflation target.
Absent further changes in the transmission mechanism that could be associated with the fall in
margins, the path of nominal interest rates will return to where it would have been in the absence
of the fall in margins.
It is not difficult to think of other changes in the transmission mechanism that could be the
result of a change in margins.  The redistribution from profits to wages, which is the other face of
the fall in margins,  could boost aggregate demand.  This would be the case if wage earners have,
on average, higher propensities to spend than the recipients of profit income.  This would suggest
that the output gap could widen, putting upward pressure on inflation in the medium term.
Monetary policy might have to tighten in the medium term, not loosen as the conventional wisdom
has it.
3.1.4. A fall in the NAIRU and UK monetary policy
A lower NAIRU or equilibrium rate of unemployment, likewise has no straightforward
implications for the path of short nominal rates that supports an unchanged inflation target.  In my
view of the world, for any given path of the actual unemployment rate, a lower NAIRU will put
downward pressure on the growth rate of expected real wages.  
A simple example of such a model is an open economy adaptation of the extension by
Buiter and Jewitt (1981) of the Taylor overlapping contracts model.  The Buiter-Jewitt version
of the Taylor model has staggered, overlapping real wage contracts rather than staggered
overlapping nominal wage contracts, as in the original Taylor model.  For simplicity we restrict
the analysis to two-period contract.23  Lower-case symbols denote the natural logarithm of the
corresponding upper-case symbol; U is the actual unemployment rate and  the NAIRU or theU N
natural rate of unemployment.  Money contracts last for two periods.  Each period, half the labour
forces negotiates a new contract.  The money wage contract negotiated this period, , is chosenTt
(or negotiated) to achieve a level of the average real contract wage over the life of the contract,
that depends positively on the real contract wage negotiated last period and the real contract wage
expected to be negotiated next period.  Thus, in general, the current real contract wage can depend
on both past and expected future real contract wages.  I rule out the case where it depends only on
the expected future real contract wage ( ).  It also depends on the average unemployment rate( ' 1
expected over the life of the contract.  Finally, it depends on an index of the target real wage,
denoted .  One would expect the growth rate of the target real wage, , toJ¯ g¯t / )J¯t / J¯t & J¯t&1
track, over time, the trend rate of growth of labour productivity.
24 The method of undetermined coefficient is an easy way to derive the solution.
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25 The other solution is given below.
It makes little economic sense, unless , the purely forward-looking case, which I am not( ' 1
considering.  When  (that is, when the model is more backward-looking than forward-looking), the real( < ½
wage growth process becomes non-stationary, and it is more non-stationary, the smaller .  When ,( ( > 0.5
the autoregressive component in the real wage process is stationary, but the infinite sums for the forcing
variables will explode, even when the forcing variables are constant.
26 If , the infinite sums in (14) would not converge, even if the target growth rate of real( > 0.5
wages and the unemployment rate were constant.
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We can use (13) to solve for the current real contract wage as a function of last period’s
real contract wage and of current and anticipated future values of the fundamental,
unemployment.24 There are two solutions.  The sensible one is given in equation (14).25
Note that this solution only makes sense when , that is, the wage setting process( < 0.5
must be mainly backward-looking.26  When the unemployment rate is expected to remain constant,
p t ' ½(µt % Tt % l t & yt % µt&1 % Tt&1 % lt&1 & yt&1) .
27 Equation (14) assumes that all labour has the same productivity.  If workers retained  the
productivity level of their contracting period, equation (14) would become 
The simpler specification of (14) seems more plausible.
20
)Tt ' ½ EtB˜t%1 % B˜t % g¯ t &
R
2(1&()
U t % j
4
i'1
(
1&(
i&1 1
1&(
EtUt%i (21)
p˜ ' (1&")p % "(p f % s) (19)
wt ' ½(Tt % Tt&1) (16)
p ' µ % w % l & y (17)
p t ' ½(Tt % Tt&1) % µt % lt & yt (18)
B˜t ' ½)Tt % ½)Tt&1 % )µt & g t % )lt (20)
The average wage paid in period t ,  , is the average of the current and previous contractwt
wage,
Equation (10) can be rewritten as27
This then implies
The relationship between the RPI, the domestic value added deflator and import prices can
be written as
Let  be the growth rate of labour productivity andgt /yt & yt&1 & (l t & lt&1)
 the real exchange rate.  Equations (18) and (19) imply thatlt / st % p
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28 The economically sensible solution will have the following general structure:
The determination of the undermined coefficients is left as an exercise for the reader.
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¼ Etp˜t%1 % B˜t % Et&1B˜t % B˜t&1
this model exhibits inflation persistence, as is apparent from equation (22).28
From (21) it is apparent that lower expected real wage growth can mean lower money
wage inflation, if the expected rate of price inflation is unchanged.  It can mean unchanged money
wage inflation if the expected rate of price inflation falls.  It is even consistent with rising money
wage inflation if the expected rate of price inflation rises even more. 
From equation (21), we also see how current period contract wage inflation depends on
RPI inflation during the current period and on current expectations of next period’s RPI inflation.
From equation (16) the current inflation rate of average money wages is a weighted average of
current and last period’s contract wage inflation:  .  The RPI inflationwt ' ½ )Tt % )Tt
augmentation term in the equation for the inflation rate of average money wages therefore is
Note that this ‘RPI inflation augmentation term’ includes both past RPI inflation and past
expectations of current RPI inflation (as well as current RPI inflation and current expectations of
future RPI inflation).
With the RPI inflation augmentation term in the money wage equation partly predetermined
(that is, inherited from the past), lower expected real wage growth is likely to  mean lower money
29 Remember that the solution is only well-defined if .( < 0.5
30 For notational simplicity, I assume that the growth rate of productivity, the target growth rate of
real wages and the actual unemployment rate are all constant.  The general case can be reconstructed easily
from (21) or (22).
22
U N / R&1(1 & 2()[g¯ & g] (23)
vt & ½(p˜t%Et p˜t%1) ' vt&1 & ½(p˜t&1%p˜t) % g &
R
1&2(
(U & U N) (24)
wage growth in the short run.  Given an unchanged mark-up, and an unchanged growth rate of
labour productivity, price inflation on the GDP deflator measure will also be lower in the short
run than it would otherwise have been.  Once the influence of inherited nominal contracts wears
off, however, the lower NAIRU only has implications for the path of real wages, not for price
inflation or money wage inflation separately.  Monetary policy maps real wage growth into money
wage growth and inflation in the long run. 
There may appear to be no sign of the NAIRU in equations (21) and (22), but a long-run
equilibrium unemployment rate, which depends only on long-run structural factors, is implicit in
the wage and price mechanism.  I define the NAIRU as that constant unemployment rate that would
be consistent with a constant rate of inflation, a constant share of labour in value added (that is,
a constant mark-up), a constant real exchange rate, a constant growth rate of labour productivity
and a constant growth rate of target real wages.  This very long-run definition of the NAIRU
implies that 
Not surprisingly, the NAIRU increases when the target growth rate of real wages rises,
when the growth rate of labour productivity falls and when the responsiveness of real wages to
unemployment falls.29  Substituting (23) into (15), we can write the real contract wage adjustment
equation, when the actual unemployment rate is constant, as follows:30
Thus, in the short run, with current contract wage inflation in part anchored in past
expectations and past actual inflation, a reduction in the natural rate of unemployment will exercise
downward pressure on currently negotiated money wage settlements.  This means that in the short
run nominal interest rates can be lower than they would have been otherwise.  Over time, the
actual unemployment rate will, partly through the endogenous, automatic servomechanism of a
market economy and partly through deliberate policy actions, follow the natural rate down to its
new lower level.  At that point, nominal interest rates will have to revert to the level where they
would have been in the absence of a fall in the natural rate of unemployment, if an unchanged
inflation target is to be met.  
It remains true, of course, that even though nominal interest rates will, in the long run, with
the actual unemployment rate down at the level of the lower natural rate, be back at the same level
they would have been at without a change in the natural rate, interest rates will be at a level lower
than they would have been if the unemployment rate had to be kept at the new lower level without
the fall in the natural rate.  Indeed, given the view of the transmission mechanism outlined here,
it would not have been possible, without the fall in the natural rate, to keep unemployment
permanently at the level corresponding to the new lower natural rate.  Inflation would rise without
31 Equivalently, I assume the real exchange rate is constant.
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bound, and nominal interest rates with it.
3.1.5. Higher trend productivity growth and UK monetary policy
An increase in the growth rate of trend productivity has no straightforward implications for
inflation and for the path of nominal interest rates consistent with a given inflation target, even in
the short run.  The common assertion that it will reduce the rate of inflation, or permits lower
nominal rates without endangering the inflation target, appears to be based on one of two
misguided bits of analysis.
The first is a labour market story.  For sake of brevity, I will conduct the discussion in
terms of the rate of inflation of the GDP deflator.31  Using the wage-price model of the previous
subsection, the rate of inflation of the value added deflator, , is the growth rate of unit labourB
costs, , plus the growth rate of margins, .)w & g )µ
Holding constant the growth rate of money wages, a higher growth rate of productivity will
reduce the growth rate of unit labour costs.  If margins do not increase, this will mean lower price
inflation.  The argument is absolutely correct but quite irrelevant.  In general, it does not make
much sense to assume that the target growth rate of real wages is constant when the growth rate of
productivity increases.  For a given path of unemployment, expected real wage growth can be
expected to increase in line with the underlying growth rate of labour productivity.  In terms of the
model of the previous sub-section,  and g can be expected to move in tandem.  This need not beg¯
the case if the productivity growth reflects changes in labour market institutions and practices that
weaken the bargaining strength of labour, but it is a useful benchmark.  
With expected real wage growth rising in line with trend productivity growth, the effect
of higher productivity growth on money wage growth depends entirely on the behaviour of
expected inflation.  Assume for simplicity, that the public does not make systematic errors when
it forms its price inflation expectations.  In that case, the behaviour of money wage inflation moves,
other things being equal, one-for-one with price inflation.  With price inflation moving one-for-one
with wage inflation (given productivity growth and given the markup), there is no way we can
explain what happens to price inflation and wage inflation individually.  We know how they hang
together, but we cannot tell how they hang separately.  Again, we need a story about monetary
policy to translate changes in expected real wage growth into paths for price inflation and money
wage inflation.
The second simple productivity-growth-to-inflation nexus is based on a misinterpretation
of the most basic identity in macroeconomics, the equation of exchange.  Let M be the nominal
stock of money and V the income velocity of circulation of money.
In growth rate form this identity can be rewritten as:
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Those who argue that higher productivity growth means lower inflation make two implicit
assumptions.  First, higher productivity growth means higher output growth.  The correct statement
would be that, other things being equal,  higher productivity growth means a higher growth rate of
potential output.  To translate potential output growth into actual output growth, the proper
quantum of aggregate demand needs to be in place.  Second, monetary policy somehow fixes the
growth rate of nominal GDP or nominal income.  Equivalently, monetary policy fixes the growth
rate of the nominal money stock, corrected for changes in velocity.  It is a tautology that a higher
growth rate of real output will, with a constant growth rate of nominal output, mean lower
inflation.
The problem with this is that the growth rate of nominal GDP is not fixed by policy.  It is
not even a target of monetary policy, although some, notably Sam Brittan, have argued that it should
be.  What kind of monetary policy rule would support a constant growth rate of nominal GDP in
the face of an increase in the growth rate of potential GDP?  From the equation of exchange, it is
clear that changes in the growth rate of the nominal money stock would have to offset exactly any
changes in the growth rate of the velocity of circulation of money.  
The transitional dynamics of the velocity of circulation of money are one of the deeper
mysteries of empirical monetary economics.  Common models of money demand make the money-
income ratio a decreasing function of the opportunity cost of money and an increasing function of
the ratio of private consumption to GDP.  Other variants include a wider spectrum of alternative
rates of return, financial wealth, human capital and a variety of scale variables aiming to capture
the transactions role of money.  In what follows I interpret money narrowly, as central bank money
or base money.  The opportunity cost variable for this non-interest-bearing asset is the short
nominal interest rate, and wealth variables should not affect the demand for this rate-of-return-
dominated asset.  Let c be(the natural logarithm of) private consumption.  A typical long-run money
demand function would be
In the long run, that is, on the new balanced growth path, velocity will be constant, albeit
perhaps at a different level.  Therefore, in the long run, a constant growth rate of the nominal
money stock would, if associated with a higher growth rate of potential and actual output, produce
a lower rate of inflation.  If the central bank is charged with achieving an unchanged inflation
target, a higher growth rate of nominal money will be consistent with that inflation target in the
long run.
The growth rate of the nominal money stock is not the instrument of monetary policy,
however.  The operational monetary policy instrument is a short nominal interest rate, the 2-week
repo rate in the UK.  This matters for the long-run response of the price level to shocks.  
When the nominal interest rate is either set exogenously, or, as in the case of the Taylor
rule, is a function only of real variables (the real interest rate, the rate of inflation and the output
gap, say), the behaviour of the nominal variables, that is, the price level, the money wage and the
nominal money stock, is different from what it would be if the nominal money stock were the
32 This will not be the case if the nominal interest rate is made a function of some nominal variable,
such as past, current or anticipate values of the nominal money stock, the price level or the money wage.
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instrument of policy, even if the monetary rule targets and achieves the same inflation target, as
would be the case, for instance, under the McCallum rule.  
If there are no nominal rigidities, nominal interest rules result in price level or nominal
indeterminacy.32 While the rate of inflation, the growth rate of the nominal money stock and all
other real variables are determinate, the price level sequence and the nominal money stock
sequence are not.  In our neo-Keynesian model, the initial value of the price level and/or the money
wage is anchored in history.  There is no nominal indeterminacy, but the long-run values of the
price level, the money wage and the nominal money stock are ‘hysteretic’ or path-dependent.  They
depend on the initial conditions.  Under a nominal interest rate rule like the Taylor rule it is indeed
the case that a real, structural change such as a lowering of margins, can permanently lower the
path of the price level, even though it will have no permanent effect on the rate of inflation.  This
would not be the case under a monetary rule like the McCallum rule, or under a nominal income
targeting rule that both achieve the same inflation target in the long run.
What can we expect to happen, in the long run, and on average, to the short nominal interest
rate if the growth rate of potential output rises?  From our earlier discussion of the international
determinants of the UK interest rate, it is clear that the answer  depends on what happens to the
real rate of interest in the long run when the growth rate of potential output rises.  Ignoring, for
simplicity, term and risk premia, the expected real interest rate, r, equals the nominal interest rate,
i, minus the expected rate of inflation, , that isBˆ
Still restricting ourselves to the long run, actual and expected inflation will not be far out
of line, so in the long run
Finally, in the long run, the real interest rate in the UK will equal that in the rest of the
world
If the world real rate of interest is not changed in the long run, the achievement of an
unchanged inflation target will still require the same long-run path of UK nominal interest rates as
before, regardless of what happens to the growth rate of UK potential output.  If UK nominal rates
were lower on average than before, we would see a lower long-run rate of inflation in the UK. 
It is quite easy to think of circumstances where an increase in the growth rate of UK
potential output is associated with an increase in the long-run global real rate of interest.  This
would be the case, for instance, if, New Paradigm-style, the increase in the growth rate of
productivity were a world-wide phenomenon associated with an increase in the marginal real rate
of return to capital investment.  If the equity risk premium is unchanged, the global real rate of
interest would also rise, and the UK real interest rate with it.  With an unchanged inflation target,
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the long-run average path of the UK short nominal interest rate would have to be higher, not lower.
The short-run effect of an increase in the growth rate of potential output on the path of
nominal rates that achieves an unchanged inflation target is much less clear-cut.  As will be
apparent by now, I favour a rather neo-Keynesian view of the short-run transmission mechanism,
which attributes a significant role to short-term nominal price and wage rigidities and to the
‘output gap’, the gap between the actual level of output (which I take to be  demand-determined),
and potential output.  In such a world, the appropriate short-term response of short nominal rates
is often in the opposite direction from the intended and expected long-run change.  
The Taylor rule, according to which nominal interest rates move more than one-for one
with (actual and expected) inflation, and also respond positively to the output gap, is a useful
example of the kind of nominal interest rule that can produce, depending on the nature of the
shocks, short-term interest rate changes that are in the same direction as the long-run changes in
the interest rate or in the opposite direction.  Let  be the target inflation rate and  capacityB˜( Y¯
output.  The Taylor rule is given in (32).
In the long-run, with output at its capacity level, actual and expected inflation equal to the
target rate of inflation and the expected real interest rate equal to the world real rate, the short
nominal interest rate is given by
Typically, with this rule, a lower target rate of inflation requires (other things being equal)
higher nominal rates in the short run, but a lower nominal interest rate in the long run.  A higher
short real interest rate will, other things being equal, call for higher nominal rates, both in the short
run and in the long run.  A lower level of the output gap today calls for a lower nominal rate in the
short run.  In the long-run, with the economy back at capacity, nominal interest rates are unchanged.
The appropriate short-run response of short-term nominal interest rates to an increase in
the trend rate of growth of productive potential depends on how the short and medium-term
balance of aggregate demand and aggregate supply is affected by this ‘supply-side’ improvement.
I assume that the real interest rate and the target inflation rate are unchanged.  Productive potential,
in our set-up is given by the real value added that would be produced if employment were at its
equilibrium level.  Since there is no evidence of significant intertemporal substitution in labour
supply, equilibrium employment can be written as , where  is the exogenous labourL¯(1 & U N) L¯
force.  Potential output is therefore given by
So-called ‘supply side’ shocks or supply side improvements almost always have direct
33 For reasons of space, I lump inventory investment in with aggregate investment.
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and indirect effects on aggregate demand as well.  It is clear that, even with an unchanged path of
nominal interest rates, aggregate demand is likely to be boosted by the kind of structural changes
that boost the trend growth rate of productive potential, which we can represent here as an increase
in the growth rate of total factor productivity, A. 
Aggregate demand is the sum of private consumption, C, private investment, I, government
exhaustive spending, G, and net exports, X.33
Private consumption depends on permanent after-tax labour income, current after-tax
labour income and real financial wealth.  It may also depend, through the intertemporal substitution
channel, on the path of current and anticipated future real interest rates, although the empirical
evidence does not support a strong effect.  Risk and attitudes towards risk are also important.
Consumption can be affected both by rate of return uncertainty and by uncertainty about the stream
of future after-tax labour income.  ‘Confidence effects’ influence investment as well as
consumption.  Private financial wealth is the sum of real stock market wealth, q, real housing
wealth, the real value of the stock of base money, the real value of the public debt and the real
value of net claims on the rest of the world.  Private investment can be viewed as driven by q, by
confidence effects and by corporate cash-flow, liquidity and balance sheet strength.  Net exports
depend negatively on domestic demand and positively on real competitiveness and on demand in
the rest of the world.  Higher growth of potential output can affect aggregate demand through a
variety of channels.  Households’ perceptions of their permanent incomes are likely to be boosted,
even if their current incomes do not rise immediately (they may well do so).  If any part of the
productivity gains is appropriated by the owners of capital, stock market valuations will rise and
household financial wealth with it.  This will boost consumption.  Even if the valuation of existing
capital is not boosted (for the reasons mentioned earlier, that the technical progress cannibalises
the old capital stock and reduces profit margins), the return to investment in the appropriate new
sectors could be very high.  Tobin’s ‘average q’ could be depressed, yet his ‘marginal q’ could
be very high.  Intangibles like household and business confidence may be boosted.  All this will
stimulate private consumption and private investment.  It is not at all inconceivable, that aggregate
demand is, in the short and medium term, boosted by more than potential output.  This would call
for a higher path of nominal interest rates in order to achieve an unchanged inflation target, not a
lower one.  In the long run, if the real interest rate and the inflation target are unchanged, higher
productivity growth will have no effect on the path of nominal interest rates.  It remains true, of
course, that the higher growth rate of actual output could not have been sustained with the same
level of nominal rates if there had not been a matching increase in the growth rate of potential
output.
All this is a long, some might say, long-winded, way of saying that inflation is a monetary
phenomenon.  It is important to remind oneself of that old truth however, lest one gets carried away
on a wave of supply side euphoria.
Clearly, knowledge of supply-side developments, including, where empirically relevant,
those of the New Paradigm, are essential for the proper formulation of monetary policy.  When we
see the unemployment rate at 5.9%, we clearly worry rather less about excessive tightness in the
labour market if we believe the NAIRU is 5.0% than we would if we were to believe it to be
7.0%.  The implications for monetary policy of uncertainty about the NAIRU or about the output
34 See e.g. HM Treasury (1999).
35 See e.g. O’Mahony and Wagner (1996), McKinsey Global Institute (1998), Baily (1999), Gordon
(1999a, b), Murray and Smithers (1999)
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gap is an important, but as yet unresolved issue (see e.g. Orphanides (1999).  Real final demand
growth and GDP growth at 3.5% worry us rather less if we believe the trend rate of growth of
potential GDP to be 3.0% than if we believe it to be 2.25%.  In an economy undergoing structural
change, past empirical regularities may be even worse guides to the future than usual.  
For what it is worth, I certainly believe that the natural rate of unemployment in the UK is
lower in 1999 than it was in 1979.  Whether its level, however, is closer to 7.0% than to 5.0% is
something no one can be confident about.  I am also happy to take seriously the proposition that
a combination of privatisation, deregulation, globalisation and technological change are making
for a sustained decline in the equilibrium mark-up on normal unit variable cost.  The magnitude
of this is, again, quite up in the air.  
It is even possible that the trend rate of growth of potential output in the UK has gone up
by 0.25% or 0.50% per annum or so.  There are some indications that the growth rate of the labour
force may be picking up relative to its behaviour in the recent past.  Working age population is
expected to grow by an average 0.4% per annum until 2005.  This rate is somewhat faster than the
average 0.3% per annum experienced during the 1990s but slightly lower than that in the 1980s.
In addition, the employment rate in the next five years or so may be rising (reflecting reductions
in inactivity), in contrast to the declining employment rate of the 1990s.34  Unlike the US, however,
there is no evidence whatsoever as yet in the aggregate data of an increase in the trend growth rate
of total factor productivity.35  
Whatever the plausibility and quantitative significance of these supply-side improvements,
whether part of the New Paradigm or not, it is vitally important that we recognise that their
implications for monetary policy, given an unchanged inflation target, are by no means
straightforward.  The view that a sustained reduction in the natural rate of unemployment, a
sustained fall in margins or a sustained increase in the rate of growth of productivity all
unambiguously imply that the path of short term nominal interest rates can be lower than it would
otherwise have been, without this posing a threat to the inflation target, is almost certainly
mistaken.
3.2. The ‘death of inflation’
The reports of the death of inflation are distinctly exaggerated and premature.  Inflation is not dead.
This particular parrot is not even stunned or sleeping.  It is under control, no more or less than that.
In a world in which the monetary standard ultimately rests on state-issued fiat money, inflation is,
ultimately, a political choice.  It is under control because across the world, the popular and
political consensus turned against inflation and because this inflation aversion was expressed in
the form of more effective institutions for conducting monetary and fiscal policy.  
Low inflation was the outcome of a similar political choice even during the era of very low
(albeit volatile) average inflation that lasted for much of the world from the end of the Napoleonic
Wars until the beginning of World War I.  During the later part of this period, many of the leading
nations of the world were on the gold standard.  Gold is a commodity money, whose production
is governed by mining technology, the cost of contributing inputs and the non-monetary demand for
the commodity.  If this were the only kind of money, and if there are no effective private or public
money substitutes, there can be no political control over the price level.
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However, during the 19th century, government-issued fiat money and private fiat monies
often coexisted with gold as means of payment and stores of value.  Convertibility, and the price
at which convertibility takes place, is always a political choice in the case of government fiat
money.  In the case of private fiat money, convertibility, to the extent that it was not legally
required and enforceable, was again a choice, informed this time by private profit-maximising
considerations.  The unregulated, competitive issuance of private money in an exclusively private
money economy, can not only be associated with inflation, it is likely to be associated with price
level indeterminacy.
The adoption by many 19th century nations of the Gold Standard was a political choice.
There were alternatives, from bimetallism to fiat money without any link to commodity money.
During earlier periods of commodity money, going back to the Roman empire and earlier, debasing
the coinage was a popular means of financial the budget deficit of the sovereign.  The political
choice to adopt the gold standard and to abide by its rules, gave us a long spell of low average
inflation in the 19th century.  Modern societies have made the choice to invest political capital in
the adoption of price stability objectives, often supported by operationally independent central
banks.  The UK is a fully signed-up member of this happy band.  However, the price of price
stability is eternal vigilance.  Anything that can do done politically can be undone politically.
Inflation can only die when money dies.  The day the last bank note is put out of business
by new electronic means of payment and funds transfer and the day the private sector can create
liquidity that is as unchallengeable under any circumstances as the liquidity provided today by the
central bank, is the day inflation of the state-provided monetary standard dies.  That is still some
way off.  
Even if the state is out of the money business, there may continue to be private monies
(media of exchange and means of payment).  The risk of inflation (indeed of price level
indeterminacy) of the private monetary medium or media will continue to exist.  Only when the
world reverts to a high-tech form of barter, in which ‘money’ (or monies) exist only as a
numéraire, will inflation be truly dead.
3.3. The ‘end of ‘boom and bust’
If the ‘end of boom and bust’ is interpreted as the end of the business cycle, it is an illusion.
Capitalist economies are inherently cyclical.  When I first studied economics as an undergraduate
in Cambridge between 1968 and 1971, bookshelves were groaning under the weight of learned
treatises announcing the death of the business cycle.  We all know what happened since then.  If
the ‘end of boom and bust’ means anything, it is that policy no longer amplifies and exaggerates
the inherent cyclical swings of activity in capitalist economies.  
Too often, during the post World War II era, ‘stabilisation’ policy has been destabilising,
feeding booms and reinforcing cyclical contractions.  An independent central bank and a
framework for medium and long-term fiscal stability should stop us shooting ourselves in that
particular foot.  That is the most we can hope for.  Ambitions beyond that will be self-defeating.
3.4. Neanderthal Keynesian fallacies
It is essential that we be clear about what monetary policy can and cannot deliver.  Monetary
policy can provide the public good of macroeconomic stability:  sustained low inflation and
moderate economic fluctuations.  It can also help reduce the risk of financial crises and prevent
them from developing into economic calamities on the scale of the Great Depression of the 1930s.
It cannot do more than that.
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36 Let  be the nominal rental cost of housing,  the nominal house price and  the housingDH P H *H
depreciation rate.  Then (ignoring risk premia) the following relationship holds
This can be rewritten as 
Thus, the appropriate interest rate term in the true cost of housing services is a real “own interest rate” for
housing.
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There is a view that a policy of sustained, systematic depreciation of the nominal exchange
rate can produce a sustained weakening of the real exchange rate, a lasting improvement in
international competitiveness and a permanently lower rate of unemployment or even a permanent
increase in the growth rate of real GDP (see e.g. Mills and Mitchell (1999)).  I regret to say that
this is a delusion.  Nominal exchange rate depreciations engineered by expansionary monetary
policy have a temporary effect on international competitiveness.  These transitory real effects are
then eroded by higher domestic cost and price inflation.  Any real effects are smaller and shorter-
lived when the use of the exchange rate as an instrument in the pursuit of international competitive
advantage becomes systematic and predictable.
Any temporary effects from expansionary monetary policy on the real exchange rate are
desirable and welcome, when they correct an existing overvaluation . Under these circumstances
they expedite and facilitate a necessary correction of international relative costs and prices that
would otherwise have to occur through differential rates of price and cost inflation between the
UK and its overseas competitors.  Temporary real exchange rate effects of monetary policy are
undesirable and unwelcome when they cause a departure from a balanced international price and
cost configuration, and a fortiori when they reinforce an existing undervaluation.
A related fallacy starts from the correct observation that our monetary instrument, a short
nominal interest rate, has a direct effect on the RPI, through the mortgage interest component of that
index.  The fallacy is the conclusion that interest rate increases raise the cost of living and the rate
of inflation, and that the way to reduce inflation therefore is to cut interest rates.  
There are two distinct rebuttals to this fallacy.  The first is the observation that inclusion
of nominal mortgage interest payments in the RPI makes no sense if the RPI is to approximate a
proper cost of living index.  The housing cost component that should be in the cost of living index
is the actual or imputed rental cost of housing.  This depends positively on the nominal interest
rate, the housing stock depreciation rate and the current price of housing, but negatively on the
expected future price of housing.  Including nominal interest rates, and current housing prices, but
excluding capital gains on housing, as is the current RPIX practice, makes no economic sense.36
The proper interest rate in the cost of housing services is the “own real interest rate” for housing,
37 Similar views have been advanced by Friedman (1968), King (1997) and Viñals and  Vallés (1999).
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that is, the nominal interest rate corrected for the expected proportional rate of increase in the
price of housing.
The second rebuttal accepts, regretfully, that the RPI is what it is, warts and all, and that
this distorted index may play a role in the price and wage-setting process, if only because those
bargaining over real wages do believe it to be a reliable cost of living index.  The further fallacy
then is, that the RPI exclusive of mortgage interest, RPIX, is viewed as independent of what
happens to interest rates.  When we raise rates, a larger mortgage interest bill is therefore added
to a constant interest-exclusive price index.  Inflation (or rather the price level) rises.  This is a
fallacy, because, over time, higher interest rates depress RPIX by more than they raise X.  It is true
that, if wage bargains are influenced significantly by the RPI, attempts to control inflation by
changing rates will be slower and more costly, in terms of output and employment foregone, than
they would otherwise have been.  The longer-run effectiveness of interest rate policy is not
impaired by this, however.
3.5. The fine tuning fallacy
To recognise that expansionary monetary policy does have an effect, albeit transitory, on
international competitiveness and other real magnitudes, is not the same as arguing that monetary
policy can be used to fine tune the international competitive position or eliminate the business
cycle altogether. For that to be the case, we not only have to know the sign of these effects, but
also their timing and magnitude. It is one of the oldest shibboleths of macroeconomics, that the
lags in the transmission of monetary policy are long, variable and uncertain.  Unfortunately, this
shibboleth is true.  This irreducible uncertainty about the magnitude and the timing of the effects
of monetary policy on the real economy, including competitiveness, output and employment, means
that monetary policy has but a very limited role as an instrument for dampening the national
business cycle.37
Scholarly research sometimes encourages the fine tuning fallacy.  A typical recent example
is the study by Brigden and Nolan (1999) of the cost to the UK of joining a monetary union.  Their
analytical framework is a very sparse model of a multi-country economy.  Each country is fully
characterised by four parameters:  two ‘structural’ parameters, the slope of the short-run Phillips
curve and the correlation coefficient between domestic and foreign supply shocks; and two policy
parameters, the relative weight placed on inflation as opposed to output stabilisation by the
national monetary authority and the weight accorded to individual countries in the European
monetary authority’s loss function.
There is assumed to be only one kind of shock, a national aggregate supply shock.  The
national monetary authority is assumed to observe the national supply shock immediately and
perfectly.  It then sets national monetary policy instantaneously and optimally to cope with this
shock.  The authority knows the true structure of the economy (not too hard, in the exercise under
consideration, but rather harder in the real world) and this structure of the economy makes
certainty equivalent strategies optimal:  the only random shocks are the perfectly observed additive
random (supply) shocks, the model is linear and the objective functions are quadratic.  The
domestic authority is assumed to be able to control the domestic rate of inflation directly and
exactly (wish it were so).  As a result, it makes no difference at all to their framework whether the
national economies are financially isolated or fully integrated into the global financial system.
Indeed, a remarkable implication of this set-up is that, in a paper investigating the consequences
38 A further serious flaw in this study is that the numerical estimates of the correlation between the
supply shocks faced by the UK and other nations, rely on supply shock estimates that are almost surely
misidentified.  The supply shock time series on which these numerical estimates are based are from Bayoumi
and Eichengreen (1994).  Bayoumi and Eichengreen  identify supply shocks through the restriction that only
permanent supply shocks have permanent real effects.  As pointed out, for instance, in Buiter (1997), such an
identifying restriction is incorrect in virtually any modern macroeconomic model.  Permanent real shocks to
aggregate demand (that is, all shocks other than shocks to the demand for or supply of money) will, in general,
have permanent real effects.  Fiscal policy shocks, time preference shocks and other IS shocks are examples. 
The Bayoumi-Eichengreen framework completely fails to distinguish between LM shocks and IS shocks.  It
also completely fails to even consider the possibility of shocks originating in the foreign exchange markets,
e.g. foreign exchange risk premium shocks and speculative bubbles originating in the foreign exchange
markets.
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for the UK of adopting an alternative exchange rate regime, the exchange rate itself does not appear
at all.  The authors attempt to add  empirical content by ‘calibrating’ the model with quasi-real
world estimates of the four key country-specific parameters, thus further contributing to the
confusion of the unwary.38
While heroic oversimplification and the cavalier use of numerical calibration are common
and innocuous in four-finger classroom exercises, they are rather serious shortcomings in a study
that purports to be a serious empirical assessment of (part of) the costs of the UK joining the
Economic and Monetary Union.
Without any uncertainty about the transmission mechanism (the magnitude and timing of the
response of the economy to changes in the policy instrument), and with only a single, perfectly
observed nation-specific shock, national monetary policy can, not surprisingly, do rather well as
regards improving the trade-off between inflation and output variability.  As a guide to policy, or
as a contribution to the pros and cons of monetary union and the cost-benefit analysis of the
abandonment of the national monetary instrument, this study is uninformative at best.  At worst, it
feeds the monetary fine tuning illusion.
4. Conclusion
It is our job to listen and to learn.  And we do both.  Some of the most enriching and informative
experiences of my professional life have been the regional visits, organised by our regional agents,
that have exposed me directly to the views, often firmly held and robustly expressed, of those who
create the wealth that ultimately sustains us all, and who view themselves to be adversely affected
by our actions.  This information, and all the other evolving facts and insights that we are exposed
to on a daily basis, form the foundation of the monthly judgment that each of us makes on rate
setting days.  
It is also part of our job to point out and correct common misperceptions about the
monetary policy process and about the monetary transmission mechanism.  Monetary policy  works
best when policy makers, the markets, and the economy at large, have a common, and preferably
not too wildly incorrect, view of how monetary policy works.
Our government-mandated objectives are clear.  How best to achieve them is,
unfortunately, less than perfectly clear even at the best of times.  I am convinced, however, that our
current monetary policy framework and our current procedures are well-designed to allow us to
make the best of this rather difficult job.
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